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A core aspect of human cognition involves overcoming the constraints of the present
environment by mentally simulating another time, place, or perspective. Although these
self-generated processes confer many beneﬁts, they can come at an important cost,
and this cost is greater for some individuals than for others. Here we explore the
possibility that the costs and beneﬁts of self-generated thought depend, in part, upon
its phenomenological content. To test these hypotheses, we ﬁrst developed a novel
thought sampling paradigm in which a large sample of young adults recalled several
recurring thoughts and rated each thought on multiple content variables (i.e., valence,
speciﬁcity, self-relevance, etc.). Next, we examined multi-level relationships among
these content variables and used a hierarchical clustering approach to partition self-
generated thought into distinct dimensions. Finally, we investigatedwhether these content
dimensions predicted individual differences in the costs and beneﬁts of the experience,
assessed with questionnaires measuring emotional health and wellbeing. Individuals who
characterized their thoughts as more negative and more personally signiﬁcant scored
higher on constructs associated with Depression and Trait Negative Affect, whereas
those who characterized their thoughts as less speciﬁc scored higher on constructs
linked to Rumination. In contrast, individuals who characterized their thoughts as more
positive, less personally signiﬁcant, and more speciﬁc scored higher on constructs linked
to improved wellbeing (Mindfulness). Collectively, these ﬁndings suggest that the content
of people’s inner thoughts can (1) be productively examined, (2) be distilled into several
major dimensions, and (3) account for a large portion of variability in their functional
outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
“You are today where your thoughts have brought you; you will
be tomorrow where your thoughts take you.” – James Allen
(1864–1912), author.
A wealth of recent cognitive and neuroscientiﬁc research sug-
gests that humans spend a remarkable amount of time engaged
in self-generated thought (Singer, 1966; Klinger, 1971; Klinger and
Cox, 1987; Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Song
and Wang, 2012), an internal mode of cognition characterized
by its capacity to overcome the constraints of the external envi-
ronment (Smallwood, 2013). Supporting its frequent occurrence,
self-generated thought is associated with a wide variety of bene-
ﬁts, enabling us to confront future challenges, solve problems, and
navigate our social world (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Baars,
2010; Christoff et al., 2011; McMillan et al., 2013; Mooneyhamand
Schooler, 2013; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). At the
same time, numerous studies suggest the experience can be asso-
ciated with signiﬁcant costs, including disrupted task performance
and poor psychological wellbeing (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Moberly and Watkins, 2008; Watkins, 2008; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010; McVay and Kane, 2010; Mooneyham and Schooler,
2013; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). In fact, a variety of
mental health disorders are deﬁned by impairments arising from
self-generated thought (Harvey et al., 2004), and such ﬁndings
suggest that the adaptive and maladaptive manifestation of the
experience varies widely across individuals. Understanding the
factors that give rise to this variability could help individuals har-
ness the beneﬁcial aspects of self-generated thought and, in doing
so, improve their psychological wellbeing.
Herewe tackle this research objective by testing recent hypothe-
ses that the content of self-generated thought represents an
important factor underlying its costs and beneﬁts (Watkins, 2008;
Mar et al., 2012; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). The con-
tent regulation hypothesis proposes that self-generated thoughts
are particularly beneﬁcial for individuals who are able to regu-
late the content of the experience to positive or productive topics
(Smallwood andAndrews-Hanna, 2013). In line with this hypoth-
esis, we predicted that individuals who primarily engaged in
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positive or productive thoughts would exhibit improved emo-
tional health and wellbeing, whereas negative or unproductive
thought content would be indicative of poor emotional health
and wellbeing. Whereas existing studies primarily focus on the
frequency of self-generated thought or a single aspect of thought
content (i.e. valence) – typically assessed in the context of cued
autobiographical memory retrieval paradigms, mood induction
paradigms, or ongoing experimental tasks – we examined several
aspects of self-generated thoughts that occupy participants’minds
throughout their daily lives. By developing a novel thought sam-
pling paradigm in which participants generate several recurring
thoughts and rate each thought on numerous content-speciﬁc
variables, we were able to (1) quantify normative estimates of
thought content in a large group of adults, (2) examine multi-level
relationships among content variables, and (3) explore which con-
tent variables predicted unique variance in the costs and beneﬁts
of the experience.
We focused on individual differences in depressive symptoms
as an important marker of poor emotional wellbeing because
(1) major depressive disorder (MDD) is the leading cause of
disability worldwide (World Health Organization, 2008), (2)
depressive symptoms predict signiﬁcant distress and impair-
ment at subclinical levels of severity (Judd et al., 1998), and (3)
individuals with a current or past history of depression often
exhibit intrusive self-generated thoughts focused on negative
self-schema (Beck, 1967; Watkins, 2008). Depressed individu-
als also “overgeneralize” based on single instances (Beck, 1967)
and exhibit overgeneral autobiographical memories that tend
to be associated with a broad range of unconstructive conse-
quences (Williams et al., 2007; Watkins, 2008). However, it is
neither clear whether overgeneral memory applies to the types
of self-generated thoughts that occur in daily life, nor whether
these characteristics are driven by the affective symptoms of
depression or the repetitive styles of thinking associated with
the disorder. To disentangle the effects of negative affect and
repetitive thought on the content of self-generated thought, we
also examined individual differences in rumination, a repetitive
style of thinking focused on “one’s symptoms of distress and the
circumstances surrounding these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 1997, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). We hypothesized that
individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms would
exhibit thought content characterized as more negative, more
self-focused and – to the degree that they also ruminate – less
speciﬁc.
To explore which aspects of thought content predict adap-
tive functional outcomes, we examined individual differences in
mindfulness – a purposeful, present-minded, and non-judgmental
mode of awareness linked to improved health and emotional well-
being (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Bishop, 2004). When measured as a
trait, mindfulness seems to buffer against symptoms of depres-
sion and rumination (Brown and Ryan, 2003), and elements
of mindfulness have been incorporated into effective treatment
therapies for a variety of mental healthdisorders, includingdepres-
sion and anxiety (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal et al., 2002; Baer,
2003). Mindful individuals report lower frequencies of negative
automatic thoughts and a heightened ability to let go of such
thoughts (Frewen et al., 2008; see also Evans and Segerstrom,
2011), and mindfulness-based interventions have been shown to
alter the nature of self-generated thoughts in similar ways (Frewen
et al., 2008). When applied to chronic depression, these thera-
pies have also shown promise in increasing the speciﬁcity and
perceived likelihood of achieving individuals’ life goals (Crane
et al., 2012). Based on these ﬁndings, we predicted that dispo-
sitional mindfulness would negatively correlate with depression
and rumination, and would be associated with thought con-
tent characterized as more positive, less self-focused, and more
speciﬁc.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-six young adults (mean age: 21.6 years; 18–35 years;
38 male) participated in the study for paid compensation. To
facilitate interdisciplinary analysis for future studies, participants
were recruited from a larger database of individuals from the
University of Colorado Boulder and the greater Boulder/Denver
community who had previously completed a battery of self-report
questionnaires, behavioral tasks, and functional neuroimaging
measures in our laboratory. Though participants within this
database were previously screened for an absence of a cur-
rent or previous self-reported psychiatric illness, nearly 30% of
participants exhibited scores on the Beck Depression Inventory
indicative of mild to moderate depression (see below), con-
sistent with prior ﬁndings that depressive symptoms often go
undiagnosed and untreated (Eisenberg et al., 2007). All pro-
cedures were carried out in accordance with the University
of Colorado Boulder’s Institutional Review Board.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Thought sampling paradigm
In a single session, all participants completed an autobiographi-
cal thought sampling paradigm, developed for the present study
to quantitatively assess the phenomenological content of a broad
range of self-generated thoughts and enable computation of reli-
able within-subject correlations. Participants recalled 36 different
thoughts that had recently been on their mind in daily life, gen-
erated a three-word description for each thought, and rated each
thought on a variety of different content variables, including self-
relevance, frequency of occurrence, importance/value, centrality
to one’s sense of self-identity, valence, emotional intensity, goal
orientation, social orientation, speciﬁcity, imagery, perspective
taking, duration of the topic or event surrounding the thought,
temporal orientation, and certainty that the event for which the
thought pertains occurred or will occur (see Table 1 for precise
questions). Both the nature of the instructions and the descrip-
tions provided by participants (i.e., “My College GPA,” “Climb
Pike’s Peak,”“MissMyParents”) suggest that participants primarily
generated self-generated thoughts that were independent of exter-
nal stimuli (i.e., stimulus-independent) and similar in content to
that observed during episodes of mind-wandering (Stawarczyk
et al., 2011).
Questionnaires
To assess individual differences in constructs relevant to men-
tal health, a subset of participants (N = 70) completed
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Table 1 | Content variables.
Content rating Question Scale
Self-relevance I consider this thought to be highly self-relevant. 0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Frequency Lately, it seems that this thought has been on my mind a great
deal.
0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Importance/value The topic of this thought is of great value or importance to me. 0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Centrality This thought contributes to my sense of self-identity. 0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Valence My own emotions pertaining to this thought are . . . 0 to 10, from very negative to very positive
Intensity The intensity of my emotions pertaining to this thought are . . . 0 to 10, from not intense at all to very intense
Goal-orientation This thought involves/involved reaching a particular goal of mine. 0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Social-orientation I consider this thought to involve/concern other people (i.e., an
upcoming date, vacation with friends).
0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Detail/speciﬁcity I would characterize this thought as being tied to a highly
detailed and speciﬁc event.
0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
Imagery When I experience this thought, my mental imagery is . . . 1 = Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision, 2 = Clear and
reasonably vivid, 3 = Moderately clear and vivid, 4 = Vague and
dim, 5 = No imagery at all, you only “know” that you were
thinking of something
Perspective When I experience this thought, I develop a mental image in
which . . .
1 = I “see” things from my own perspective (like I would in the
real world), 2 = I “see” myself from another perspective,
3 = neither
Duration of topic This thought concerns an event or a topic that lasted or will
likely last . . .
1 = many years, 2 = many months, 3 = a month, 4 = multiple
days, 5 = an entire day, 6 = minutes to hours
Temporal orientation This event took/will take place. . . 1 = more than 3 years ago, 2 = within the past 3 years,
3 = within the past 365 days (a year’s time), 4 = within the past
30 days (a month’s time), 5 = within the past 7 days (a week’s
time), 6 = yesterday, 7 = earlier today, 8 = later today,
9 = tomorrow, 10 = within the next 7 days (a week’s time),
11 = within the next 30 days (a month’s time), 12 = within the
next 365 days (a year’s time), 13 = within the next 3 years,
14 = more than 3 years from now.
Certainty I am certain that the event has taken or will take place for me 0 to 10, from strongly disagree to strongly agree
The question assessing temporal orientation and certainty were only answered for thoughts that pertained to a speciﬁc event.
a variety of self-report questionnaires related to emotional
health and wellbeing. Whereas the thought sampling paradigm
requires that participants retrieve speciﬁc examples of self-
generated thoughts and rate those thoughts on a variety of
different content variables, the mental health questionnaires
assess more general aspects of a participant’s wellbeing includ-
ing his/her behaviors, feelings, actions, and general styles
of thinking. We used conﬁrmatory factor analyses (using
maximum likelihood estimation) to isolate three latent con-
structs deﬁned from a large body of clinical literature: Depres-
sion/Negative Affect, trait Rumination, and trait Mindfulness
(Table 2). The overall ﬁt of these models was estimated
using a non-signiﬁcant χ2 and Bentler’s comparative ﬁt index
(CFI) greater than 0.95 suggestive of an adequate ﬁt of the
data.
Questionnaires assessing depressive symptoms and trait neg-
ative affect included the Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd Edi-
tion (BDI-2; Beck et al., 1996), the “Low Positive Affect” and
“Loss of Interest” subscales of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom
Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson and Clark, 1991; Watson et al.,
1995a,b), and the “Negative” subscale of the Trait version of
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al.,
1988). All questionnaires loaded signiﬁcantly (p < 0.05) on the
Depression/Negative Affect latent construct (Table 2) and provided
a good ﬁt to the data (χ2 = 3.45, df = 2, CFI = 0.96). Note that
there was considerable variability in scores across participants.
Using previously recommended cutoff scores for the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory (Beck et al., 1996), 71% of participants qualiﬁed
as minimally depressed (scores 0–11), 22% as mildly depressed
(scores 12–18), and 7% as moderately depressed (scores 19–29).
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Table 2 | Constructs related to emotional health and wellbeing.
Questionnaire Subscale Mean SD CFA latent construct Factor loading
MASQ Loss of Interest 16.13 4.53 Depression/negative affect 0.34*
MASQ Low Positive Affect 36.20 8.96 Depression/negative affect 0.37*
BDI Total Score 8.85 6.08 Depression/negative affect 0.73*
Trait PANAS Negative 17.92 5.66 Depression/negative affect 0.75*
RRS Brooding 10.59 3.36 Rumination 0.80*
RRS Depression-related 24.59 6.46 Rumination 0.97*
RRS Reﬂection 10.50 3.68 Rumination 0.57*
RRQ Rumination 40.69 8.18 Rumination 0.30*
FFMQ Acting with awareness 24.62 5.51 Mindfulness 0.72*
FFMQ Describing 26.90 5.99 Mindfulness 0.66*
FFMQ Non-judging of experience 27.49 5.46 Mindfulness 0.69*
FFMQ Non-reactivity to inner experience 22.28 3.98 Mindfulness 0.45*
FFMQ Observing sensations, perceptions, thoughts, feelings 25.73 4.60 Mindfulness −0.15
CFA, conﬁrmatory factor analysis; MASQ,Mood andAnxiety SymptomQuestionnaire; BDI, BeckDepression Inventory, 2nd Edition; PANAS, positive and negative affect
schedule; RRS, Ruminative Responses Scale; RRQ, Rumination-Reﬂection Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; FFMQ, Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire; *p < 0.05.
Questionnaires assessing trait rumination included “Brood-
ing,” “Depression-Related,” and “Reﬂection-Related” subscales
of the Ruminative Responses Scale (Roberts et al., 1998;
Treynor et al., 2003), and the “Rumination” subscale of the
Rumination-Reﬂection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell and Camp-
bell, 1999). All questionnaires loaded signiﬁcantly (p < 0.05)
on the Rumination latent construct (Table 2) and provided an
excellent ﬁt (χ2 = 0.63, df = 2, CFI = 1).
Questionnaires assessingdispositionalmindfulness included all
ﬁve subscales of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer
et al., 2006). While the “Acting with Awareness,” “Describing,”
“Non-judging of Experience,” and “Non-reactivity to Inner Expe-
rience” subscales loaded highly onto the Mindfulness construct
(p < 0.05), the “Observe” subscale loaded weakly onto the con-
struct (p = 0.27; Table 2), consistent with prior observations (Baer
et al., 2006). This model also provided an excellent ﬁt to the data
(χ2 = 3.49, df = 5, CFI = 1).
Participants’ factor scores for the Depression/Negative Affect,
Rumination, and Mindfulness latent constructs were designated
as the dependent (outcome) variable in subsequent multiple
regression analyses to explore relationships with the content of
individuals’ typical mind-wandering episodes. To examine the
speciﬁcity of the relationships between Depression, Rumination,
and thought content, we included questionnaires assessing indi-
vidual differences in anxious arousal (the “Anxious Arousal”
subscale of the MASQ) and anxious apprehension (the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990). We also assessed
state affect immediately prior to the thought sampling paradigm
using the “Positive” and “Negative” subscales of the State version
of the PANAS questionnaire. Note that while the majority of other
questionnaires were acquired in the same session subsequent to
the thought sampling paradigm, the MASQ and the PSWQ were
acquired as part of the larger study an average of 205 days earlier.
As both the MASQ and the PSWQ have high test-retest reliabil-
ity indicative of stable constructs (Stöber, 1998; Keogh and Reidy,
2000), we decided to include these questionnaires in our analyses.
STATISTICAL METHOD
Part 1: Normative estimates of thought content
The ﬁrst set of analyses sought to quantify normative estimates of
thought content across the full group of 76 participants. To extract
mean estimates of each content variable, we ﬁrst averaged partici-
pants’ ratings across the 36 different thoughts for each participant
separately. For each of the 12 content variables, we then averaged
mean ratings across participants. Participants whose mean rating
was more than 2.5 standard deviations above or below the group
mean were included in ﬁgures for visual purposes only and were
not included in calculations of the group mean.
Part 2: Identifying major dimensions of thought content
The second set of analyses sought to examine relationships
among content variables within participants, and in doing so,
identify the major dimensions of thought content. For each par-
ticipant, we computed the relationship between each pair of
content variables across his/her 36 different thoughts (i.e., speci-
ﬁcity× self-relevancy, speciﬁcity× valence, etc.) using Spearman’s
rho. Unlike Pearson’s R, Spearman’s rho does not assume the
within-participant data are normally-distributed. Next, we aver-
aged the 12 × 12 correlation matrices across participants to
generate a group mean correlation matrix. Correlations were
assessed for statistical signiﬁcanceby transforming themtoFisher’s
z using the formula 0.5 × ln[(1 + r)/(1 − r)] and conduct-
ing one-sample t-tests across the group to determine if each
correlation was signiﬁcantly different from zero, using an alpha
of p < 0.05. Given the large number of statistical tests, we
also corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni
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method and assessed signiﬁcance against a corrected alpha of
p < 0.0008.
To identify major content dimensions characterizing partici-
pants’ self-generated thoughts, we applied hierarchical clustering
analysis on the 12 × 12 group mean correlation matrix by ﬁrst
generating a distance matrix using Euclidean distance. Content
dimension scores for each participant were extracted by converting
his/her mean rating for each content variable to a z-score using the
group mean, and averaging the standardized content variable rat-
ings pertaining to the same cluster. These scores were then used to
explore relationships with constructs relevant to emotional health
and wellbeing (see below). Note that questions assessing per-
spective taking and certainty were excluded from the hierarchical
clustering analyses. Perspective taking contained no intrinsic order
in its response options, while certainty often yielded bimodal dis-
tributions at the within-subject level, a strongly positively skewed
distribution at the between-subject level (skewness = −0.97), and
was only answered for a subset of questions that pertained to a
particular event. These non-normal distributions arose because
thoughts pertaining to past events were almost always answered
with 100% certainty. All other content variables were normally
distributed at the between-subject level, with a skewness between
–0.5 and +0.5.
Part 3: Relationships with constructs relevant to mental health
Our third objective was to examine relationships between indi-
vidual differences in thought content and dimensional constructs
linked to poor and satisfactory emotional health and wellbeing.
In the subset of 70 participants who completed all mental health
questionnaires, we ran three multiple linear regression analyses
in which the participants’ thought content scores extracted from
the hierarchical clustering analysis were entered together as inde-
pendent predictors to predict participants’ factor scores from each
of the Depression/Negative Affect, Rumination, and Mindfulness
factors, respectively.
Because rumination and depression are often related, and
because bothdepression and ruminationoften co-occurwith anxi-
ety, we also explored the speciﬁcity of each construct’s relationship
to self-generated thought by conducting part correlations. This
procedure involved (1) removing from the dependent variable
(i.e., Depression/Negative Affect) variance shared with the ques-
tionnaires for which we wished to control (i.e., Anxious Arousal,
Anxious Apprehension, and Rumination), and (2) using these
standardized residuals as new dependent variables in subsequent
multiple regressions with thought content scores as predictor
variables.
For each multiple regression, we computed Cook’s Distance, a
multivariate measure of the statistical inﬂuence of an individual
on the regression function (Cook, 1977). Outliers with a Cook’s D
of > 4/N were removed from each analysis (Bollen and Jackman,
1987).
In our ﬁnal set of analyses, we isolated those aspects of thought
content that exhibited signiﬁcant relationships with emotional
health and examined whether these relationships persisted after
additionally controlling for state affect. Partial correlations were
conducted between trait factor scores and each signiﬁcant content
dimension separately, while participants’“Positive”and“Negative”
subscales of the State PANAS questionnaire were entered as
covariates of non-interest.
All tests were conducted using two-tailed criteria (p < 0.05)
and analyses were conducted using a combination of R statistical
software (R Development Core Team, 2010), SPSS (v21, IBM), and
MPlus (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2011).
RESULTS
PART 1: NORMATIVE ESTIMATES OF THOUGHT CONTENT
Although the phenomenological characteristics of self-generated
thoughts varied widely across participants, several common
themes emerged (Figure 1). On average, participants char-
acterized their thoughts as highly self-relevant, of moderate
importance or value, and moderately central to their sense of
self-identity, yet they also indicated their thoughts were moder-
ately social in nature. Participants characterized their thoughts
as moderately recurrent, somewhat goal-oriented, of moderate
emotional intensity, and positive in valence. Females rated their
thoughts as more negative than males; t(74) = 2.94, p < 0.01.
A majority of participants’ thoughts pertained to a particular
event (mean = 77.4%, SD = 20.0%), although approximately
one-quarter did not (mean = 22.6%, SD = 20.0%). Of those
thoughts that pertained to a particular event, 59.8% were oriented
toward the future (SD = 25.4%) and 40.2% were oriented toward
the past (SD = 25.4%). On average, the events for which the
thoughts pertained were expected to take place in the near future
(today or tomorrow).
Participants also characterized their thoughts as exhibiting
a moderate degree of speciﬁcity and imagery. A ﬁrst person
(“self”) visual perspective was adopted for 64.3% of thoughts
(SD = 24.8%), while participants adopted a different perspec-
tive for 18.7% of thoughts (SD = 16.0%), and did not adopt a
particular perspective for 17.0% of thoughts (SD = 18.8%). On
average, participants indicated that their thoughts pertained to
topics or events that lasted (or will last) between multiple days
and one month in duration.
PART 2: IDENTIFYING MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF THOUGHT CONTENT
As shown in Figure 2, several signiﬁcant relationships emerged
between content variables at the within-subject level, and these
relationships are reﬂected in the pattern of content dimensions
identiﬁed from a hierarchical clustering analysis (Figure 3). One
dimension, termed Level of Construal, refers to the style of abstract
versus concrete processing adopted during self-generated thought,
and includes questions pertaining to speciﬁcity, imagery and
duration of the topic or event surrounding the thought. Social ori-
entation also clustered with this dimension. Ratings for questions
encompassed in the Level of Construal dimension were signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with one another, with the exception of social
orientation (which was only related to speciﬁcity and imagery;
Figure 2). Thoughts rated as more detailed and speciﬁc were more
likely to pertain to topics characterized by a shorter duration (i.e.,
a speciﬁc episode as opposed to a general topic), to be experienced
with more vividness/imagery, and to involve other people.
A second dimension, termed Personal Signiﬁcance, included
the following content ratings: self-relevance, centrality, frequency
of occurrence, emotional intensity, value/importance, and goal
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FIGURE 1 | Phenomenological characteristics of self-generated
thought. Individual data points represent each participant’s mean across
36 self-generated thoughts. Open circles represent outliers > 2.5 SD
above or below the group mean (vertical bar) which are not included in
calculations. The scale for temporal orientation corresponds to: 1 = more
than 3 years ago, 2 = within the past 3 years, 3 = within the past 365
days (a year’s time), 4 = within the past 30 days (a month’s time),
5 = within the past 7 days (a week’s time), 6 = yesterday, 7 = earlier
today, 8 = later today, 9 = tomorrow, 10 = within the next 7 days (a
week’s time), 11 = within the next 30 days (a month’s time), 12 = within
the next 365 days (a year’s time), 13 = within the next 3 years,
14 = more than 3 years from now.
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FIGURE 2 | Relationships between content variables. Relationships
between content variables were averaged across 76 participants. For scales
corresponding to each content variable, see Figure 1 andTable 1. Note that
higher scores for Duration of Topic correspond to thoughts concerning topics
or events lasting shorter durations. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.0008 (alpha corrected
for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method).
orientation. While all of these questions were signiﬁcantly posi-
tively correlated (all r’s> 0.2, p’s< 0.001), self-relevance exhibited
the strongest relationships with centrality and subjective value
(Figure 2). Additionally, thoughts that were attributed high
value were rated as more central to one’s sense of self-identity,
higher in emotional intensity, and more recurrent. Goal-oriented
thoughts were also rated as more self-relevant, more central to
one’s sense of self-identity, more recurrent, more intense, and
more important/valuable.
A third dimension, termed Outlook, reﬂected signiﬁcant pos-
itive relationships between temporal orientation and valence
(Figures 2 and 3). Future-oriented thoughts were rated as more
positive and past-oriented thoughts were rated as more negative.
In addition to relationships between content variables within
each content dimension (i.e., self-relevancy, value, etc.), relation-
ships also emerged across variables belonging to different content
dimensions (Figure 2). More future-oriented thoughts were gen-
erally experienced with less speciﬁcity, while thoughts that were
rated as more personally signiﬁcant pertained to topics of longer
durations, yet were not necessarily less speciﬁc or vivid. Further-
more, socially oriented thoughts were experienced with greater
emotional intensity, and positive associations were observed
between emotional intensity and both imagery and speciﬁcity.
PART 3: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THOUGHT CONTENT AND
EMOTIONAL WELLBEING
The combined contribution of the 12 content variables explained
a large amount of variance in individual differences in the three
psychological constructs of interest. Speciﬁcally, thought content
explained 45.8% of the variance in Depression/Negative Affect,
30.5% of the variance in Rumination, and 36.3% of the variance
in Mindfulness. We next repeated the analyses after combining
the content variables into the composite dimensions identiﬁed
in Part 2, but splitting the dimension corresponding to Outlook
into temporal orientation and valence because of the observed
weak correlations between those content ratings and our a priori
hypotheses linking valence to depression. Thus, four indepen-
dent variables were entered together into each multiple regression
(Level of Construal, Personal Signiﬁcance, Valence, and Temporal
Orientation).
Collectively, these four types of thought content explained
33.0% of the variance in Depression/Negative Affect, R = 0.58,
F(4,58) = 7.15, p < 0.001, with Personal Signiﬁcance and
Valence contributing independent variance (Personal Signiﬁcance,
β= 0.22, t(57)= 1.99,p= 0.05;Valence, β=−0.57, t(57)=−4.65,
p < 0.001). Individuals who rated their thoughts as more per-
sonally signiﬁcant and more negative reported higher levels of
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FIGURE 3 | Hierarchical clustering reveals major dimensions of thought
content. Higher scores for the Level of Construal cluster correspond to
thoughts that are more temporally and perceptually speciﬁc, as well as
more socially oriented. Higher scores for the Personal Signiﬁcance cluster
correspond to thoughts rated as more personally signiﬁcant. Higher scores
for the Outlook cluster correspond to thoughts rated as more positive and
future-oriented. On the y -axis, height is a measure of similarity or distance
between content variables such that two variables forming a single cluster
at a small height are more similar than two variables linked at a greater
height.
Depression/Negative Affect (Figure 4A). To examine the speciﬁcity
of these ﬁndings for Depression/Negative Affect, we next controlled
for statistical effects of anxious arousal, anxious apprehension,
and Rumination on Depression/Negative Affect using a part cor-
relation, and the effects were numerically stronger, R = 0.57,
F(4,56) = 6.20, p < 0.001; Personal Signiﬁcance, β = 0.27,
t(55) = 2.41, p < 0.05; Valence, β = −0.57, t(55) = −4.45,
p < 0.001.
Depression/Negative Affect was marginally correlated with
Rumination, r(63) = 0.22, p = 0.08, allowing us to examine
relationships between self-generated thought content and each
mental health construct speciﬁcally. Although a smaller percent-
age of variance in Rumination was explained by the four classes of
thought content, R = 0.38, F(4,62) = 2.68, p = 0.04, R2 = 14.7,
Level of Construal was the only content dimension that contributed
signiﬁcant independent variance to Rumination, β = −0.32,
t(61) = −2.56, p < 0.05 (Figure 4B). As predicted, individu-
als who generated more abstract and less speciﬁc thoughts were
characterized by higher levels of Rumination. Importantly, the
relationship between Level of Construal and Rumination became
numerically stronger after controlling for comorbid effects of anx-
iety and Depression/Negative Affect on Rumination, R = 0.41,
F(4,63) = 3.24, p < 0.05,R2 = 0.17; Level of Construal: β= −0.35,
t(60) = −2.77, p < 0.01.
The four types of thought content explained 21.2% of the
variance in mindfulness, F(4,59) = 3.97, p < 0.01, with Level
of Construal, Personal Signiﬁcance and Valence contributing
independent variance (Level of Construal, β = 0.25, t(58) = 2.00,
p = 0.05; Personal Signiﬁcance, β = −0.24, t(58) = −2.1,
p < 0.05; Valence, β = 0.27, t(58) = 2.09, p < 0.05). Individu-
als who rated their thoughts as more concrete and speciﬁc, less
personally signiﬁcant, and more positive scored higher on dis-
positional mindfulness questionnaires (Figure 4C). Both Depres-
sion/Negative Affect and Rumination were negatively correlated
with Mindfulness, r(64) = −0.68, p < 0.001 and r(64) = −0.28,
p < 0.05.
Relationships with state affect
Individual differences in Depression/Negative Affect were strongly
predictive of state affect as assessed with the “positive” and “neg-
ative” subscales of the state PANAS, R = 0.59, F(2,60) = 15.60,
p < 0.001. However, state affect was not related to indi-
vidual differences in Rumination, R = 0.13, F(2,66) = 0.58,
p = 0.56. State affect was strongly related to Valence, R = 0.49,
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FIGURE 4 | Independent content predictors of constructs relevant for
mental health. Positive βs are characterized by thoughts that are more
concrete, more personally signiﬁcant, more future oriented and more positive
(see scales in Figure 1). (A) Personal Signiﬁcance and Valence contributed a
signiﬁcant amount of variance toward explaining Depression/Negative Affect.
(B) Level of Construal was the only dimension that contributed a signiﬁcant
amount of variance toward predicting individual differences in Rumination.
(C) Level of Construal and Personal Signiﬁcance contributed a signiﬁcant
amount of variance toward predicting Mindfulness, with a considerable
additional contribution of Valence (β = 0.25, p = 0.054). *p ≤ 0.05.
F(2,69) = 10.73, p < 0.001, but not to Personal Signiﬁcance,
R = 0.12, F(2,68) = 0.49, p = 0.62. When controlling for state
affect, the relationship between Depression/Negative Affect and
Valence remained signiﬁcant (r(62) = −0.51, p < 0.001; partial
r(58) = −0.44, p < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
The current study indicates that self-generated thoughts can be
well-characterized along three major content dimensions regard-
ing their level of construal, their personal signiﬁcance, and the
outlook they embody. Moreover, these dimensions explain a
notable amount of variance in individual differences in emo-
tional health and wellbeing. As such, our study speaks to
a long-standing debate in psychology and neuroscience (e.g.,
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Watkins, 2008; McVay and
Kane, 2010) by suggesting that the ability to regulate the con-
tent of self-generated thought is a key factor underlying its
costs and beneﬁts (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Indi-
viduals who characterized their thoughts as more personally
signiﬁcant, more negative, and/or less detailed scored higher
on constructs linked to poor psychological wellbeing (Depres-
sion and Rumination), whereas those who characterized their
thoughts as less personally signiﬁcant, more positive, and more
speciﬁc scored higher on constructs linked to improved well-
being (Mindfulness). Below, we synthesize our ﬁndings in the
context of prior literature and conclude by discussing future
directions for research on self-generated thought and mental
health.
POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE MODES OF THOUGHT CONTENT REFLECT
THE NORM IN A SAMPLE OF YOUNG ADULTS
Measuring the content of self-generated thought across numerous
thought samples, content variables, and participants allowed us to
extract at least three dimensions of content: Level of Construal, Per-
sonal Signiﬁcance, and Outlook. On average, participants’ thoughts
were moderately perceptually and temporally speciﬁc, consistent
with prior studies (Klinger and Cox, 1987; Delamillieure et al.,
2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011, 2013). These concrete “low-level”
construals have been linked to beneﬁcial outcomes encompassing
effective problem solving, successful attainment of future goals,
and enhanced self-regulatory behavior (Pham and Taylor, 1999;
Watkins and Baracaia, 2002; Watkins and Moulds, 2005; Leary
et al., 2006). Interestingly, socially oriented thoughts were also
experienced with greater perceptual detail. Although not the main
topic of thepresentmanuscript, theﬁnding that participants spend
a notable amount of time thinking about other people is in line
with prior studies (Mar et al., 2012; see also Ruby et al., under
review) and provides strong support for theories highlighting the
importance of social information for human cognition (Dunbar,
1998; Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010; Corballis, 2013).
Furthermore, participants’ thoughts were highly personally sig-
niﬁcant, somewhat goal-oriented, and attributed strong value,
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resonating with theories that personal concerns form the basis
of human thought content (Klinger, 1971, 2009; Fox et al., 2013;
McMillan et al., 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2013).
Consistent with prior studies, participants rated their thoughts
as somewhat positive (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Stawar-
czyk et al., 2011, 2013; Fox et al., 2013) and future-oriented
(Smallwood et al., 2009b;Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; Baird et al.,
2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011, 2013; Song and Wang, 2012; Fox
et al., 2013; Ruby et al., 2013), supporting a growing body of
work regarding the adaptive signiﬁcance of prospective thoughts
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf and
Corballis, 2007). Future-oriented thoughts were perceived asmore
positive than past-oriented thoughts, supporting prior ﬁndings
linking retrospective focus to negative mood (Smallwood and
O’Connor, 2011).
THOUGHT CONTENT RELATES TO EMOTIONAL HEALTH AND
WELLBEING
Providing strong support for the content regulation hypothesis
(Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013), our ﬁndings indicate
that thought content is an important factor underlying the adaptive
and maladaptive consequences of self-generated thought. Accord-
ing to content regulation hypothesis, self-generated thoughts are
primarily beneﬁcial when individuals are able to regulate the con-
tent of the experience to positive or productive topics (Smallwood
and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Conversely, individuals who lack this
capacity may experience maladaptive psychological consequences
of self-generated thought.
In line with these predictions, individuals who rated their
thoughts as more negative in valence as well as more personally
signiﬁcant scored higher on questionnaires assessing Depres-
sion/Negative Affect. These ﬁndings are consistent with long-held
theories that depressed individuals hold negative schemas about
themselves, their future, and the environment (Beck, 1967),
and that a dispositional style of self-focused thinking exacer-
bates the duration and symptoms of depression (Smith and
Greenberg, 1981; Larsen and Cowan, 1988). Depressed indi-
viduals also exhibit attentional and mnemonic biases toward
negative and self-referential information, difﬁculties clearing this
information from working memory, and impaired performance
particularly when the material is task-irrelevant (Gotlib and Joor-
mann, 2010; Joormann, 2010). Further support for associations
between self-focus and negative affect comes from studies linking
self-focused attention to state and trait negative affect, particularly
when the content of the self-focused thought is negative in nature
(Smith and Greenberg, 1981; Mor and Winquist, 2002). Conse-
quently, experimental inductions that amplify external focus and
dampen internal focus help depressed individuals adopt a less
pessimistic view of their future (Pyszczynski et al., 1987).
Although depressed individuals commonly exhibit overgeneral
autobiographical memories (Williams et al., 2007; Watkins, 2008),
the present results demonstrate that overgeneral styles of thinking
were more strongly related to individual differences inRumination
than to Depression/Negative Affect. These ﬁndings suggest that the
repetitive nature of self-generated thought rather than negative
affect per se, may be most strongly linked to abstract levels of con-
strual. However, since many of the questions contributing to the
rumination questionnaires pertain to negative content, it remains
yet to be determined whether overgeneral patterns of thought
also characterize other types of repetitive thought, independent
of affective content. Rumination is strongly related to, yet distinct
from, depression, and our observation that overgeneral thinking is
particularly related to Rumination agrees well with studies report-
ing elevated overgeneral memory following rumination induction
(Watkins and Teasdale, 2001; Sutherland and Bryant, 2007). The
relationship between overgeneral memory, rumination, and other
types of repetitive thought marks an interesting area for future
research.
MINDFUL ASPECTS OF THOUGHT CONTENT ARE RECIPROCALLY
RELATED TO DEPRESSION AND RUMINATION
In contrast to depression and rumination, dispositional mindful-
ness and mindfulness meditation have been linked to improved
health, cognitive ability, and psychological wellbeing (Brown and
Ryan, 2003; Sedlmeier et al., 2012). Paralleling these ﬁndings,
Mindfulness exhibited negative relationships with Depression and
Rumination, and was partly explained by an opposing pattern of
thought content, being characterized as more positive, less per-
sonally signiﬁcant, and more speciﬁc. These results are consistent
with prior research demonstrating that mindful individuals report
higher levels of positive affect (Brown and Ryan, 2003), posi-
tive or less negative thought content (Frewen et al., 2008; Evans
and Segerstrom, 2011), and better emotion regulation ability
(Farb et al., 2012).
Of relevance, brief mindfulness inductions have been shown
to dampen negative affect (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Huffziger
et al., 2013), and many of the content variables that predicted
increases in dispositional mindfulness in our study are central to
mindfulness-based therapies for a variety of mental health disor-
ders. For example, a key element of mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy involves teaching people to become aware of the nature of
their internal thoughts, view their thoughts from a more distant or
“de-centered”perspective, and accept them forwhat they are rather
than the literal truth (Segal et al., 2002; Mennin and Fresco, 2013).
When applied to recurrent depression,MBCT reduces relapse rates
by nearly 50% (Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins, 2008) and increases
the speciﬁcity of individuals’ autobiographical memory (Williams
et al., 2000, 2007).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In summary, these ﬁndings provide strong evidence that the con-
tent of people’s inner thoughts in daily life can be productively
examined and distilled into several major dimensions. More-
over, individual differences in thought content explain a notable
amount of variance in constructs relevant to emotional health and
wellbeing. As such, the present manuscript extends previous stud-
ies that focus solely on the frequency with which self-generated
thoughts occur, particularly because increases in frequency have
been linked to both adaptive and maladaptive outcomes (i.e.,
McVay and Kane, 2009; Levinson et al., 2012). In contrast, the
content characterizing self-generated thought may more precisely
constrain the functional consequences of this human experience.
Quantifying an individual’s full proﬁle of thought content – per-
haps in combination with the frequency with which self-generated
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thoughts occur, and/or thedifﬁculty of the taskduringwhichunre-
lated thoughts occurs (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013) –
might ultimately help researchers or clinicians distinguish between
different trait dimensions and/or mental health disorders.
Unfortunately, wewere unable to fully address this last question
using our sample of participants because none of our participants
were diagnosed with a mental health disorder. While we antic-
ipate similar yet stronger ﬁndings in individuals with MDD,
clinical diagnosis with depression may be associated with pat-
terns of thought content distinct from those highlighted in our
non-clinical sample. Although none of our participants reported
current or previous diagnosis of depression, they exhibited a broad
range of subclinical depressive symptoms, consistent with recent
mental health initiatives highlighting the importance of dimen-
sional classiﬁcation systems (Kupfer and Regier, 2011; Adam,
2013). Furthermore, the ﬁnding that speciﬁc patterns of thought
content predict symptomsof distress even in this non-clinical sam-
ple could provide important insight regarding risk factors for the
development of more severe symptoms. Biases in thought con-
tent may emerge prior to the onset of a major depressive episode,
perhaps providing a marker of clinical risk and a target for pre-
ventive therapies (Muñoz et al., 2010; Beshai et al., 2011). Future
longitudinal research could address these possibilities by assessing
changes in thought content over onset and recovery from MDD.
Another open question involves understanding the directional
nature of the relationship between thought content and psycho-
logical wellbeing. Does dispositional unhappiness exert a causal
inﬂuence on negative and personally signiﬁcant thoughts, or does
the act of entertaining such thoughts exacerbate poor emotional
wellbeing? Might mental health and thought content dynamically
inﬂuence each other, creating positive feedback loops? While some
studies have found initial evidence for causal relationships between
the frequency and/or content of self-generated thoughts and
wellbeing (Moberly and Watkins, 2008; Smallwood et al., 2009a;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011;
Marchetti et al., 2012a; Ruby et al., 2013), a complete understand-
ing of the nature of these relationships will require overcoming
several methodological and conceptual challenges (Mason et al.,
2013).
Another avenue for future research involves delineating the
neural underpinnings of different dimensions of thought con-
tent. The brain’s “default network” is a large-scale brain system
hypothesized to support spontaneous and goal-directed forms
of self-generated thought (Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna,
2012). Though our results agree well with ﬁndings that depression
and rumination are linked to hyperactivity of the default network
and increased connectivity with limbic regions (Marchetti et al.,
2012b; Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012), recent studies suggest
that the DMN is organized into multiple subsystems with disso-
ciable functions (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; Andrews-Hanna,
2012). How the content dimensions of self-generated thoughtmap
onto these unique DMN components remains an open question.
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